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The latest Crown financial statements report that, at 30 June 
2014, the New Zealand government held total assets valued 
at	around	$256	billion	(New	Zealand	Government,	2014).	
These included a diverse range of physical, financial and 
other assets, such as national parks, highways, state houses, 
electricity generation plant and equipment, Kiwibank 
mortgages, shares, deposits, and the National Library and 
Te Papa collections. But some of the most important assets 
that the New Zealand government develops and maintains 
are not recorded on the Crown’s balance sheet. They are the 
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regulatory arrangements 
that have been developed, 
introduced and refined 
over many years to, among 
other things, protect the 
rights, safety, property and 
other interests of its citizens, 
residents and visitors, allocate 
responsibilities for various 
risks, and otherwise help 
them transact or engage 
with each other on fair and 
efficient terms. 
Why do I suggest that regulatory 
arrangements are assets? Well, the 
definition of an asset, in the eyes of 
an accountant, is something within 
an entity’s control from which future 
economic benefits are expected to flow. 
If we adopt a national perspective and 
include benefits beyond the merely 
economic, this corresponds pretty well 
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with our expectations of any regulatory 
regime established by New Zealand 
legislation: namely, that it should deliver 
a future stream of benefits to New 
Zealanders that is greater than its costs. 
Leaving aside the measurement issues, 
the perceived legitimacy of regulation 
rests, at least in part, on satisfying this 
basic conceptual premise. 
The response from some to this 
suggestion that regulation be viewed as an 
asset will be that they can think of many 
examples of regulation where the benefits 
do not exceed costs. And in some cases they 
are likely to be right. Regulatory regimes 
that the government intended to be an 
asset for New Zealanders can in practice 
turn out to be a liability. We might call 
these cases of regulatory failure.
What disasters tell us about regulatory 
failure
There are, unfortunately, many ways in 
which regulatory regimes can fail. The 
failures that will spring to mind most 
readily are those associated with disasters 
– those highly salient events or discoveries 
that have or reveal major negative 
outcomes. We know quite a bit about these 
types of regulatory failure because they are 
usually the subject of a subsequent public 
inquiry seeking to learn lessons from the 
disaster. Oft-cited recent New Zealand 
examples include leaky buildings, failed 
finance companies, and the Pike River 
mining tragedy (Searancke et al., 2014). 
Mistakes in policy design
It seems that the seeds of a future disaster 
are frequently sown at the policy design 
stage. In their very readable book about 
UK government policy ‘blunders’, Anthony 
King and Ivor Crewe identify a range of 
‘human errors’ and ‘system failures’ that 
they argue have repeatedly produced 
major mistakes in policy design (King and 
Crewe, 2013). While their analysis is not 
specifically focused on regulation and is 
derived from UK cases, the human errors 
they have catalogued are likely to be found 
in a wide range of regulatory contexts. 
They include:
•	 cultural	disconnect	–	where	policy-
makers unconsciously project onto 
others values, attitudes and even ways 
of life that are not remotely accurate;
•	 group-think	–	where	there	is	such	
widespread agreement among a 
group, or such a desire to maintain 
group cohesion, that no one 
expresses dissent;
•	 intellectual	prejudice	–	an	
unquestioned belief that some kinds 
of institutions and some kinds of 
policies can be counted on to work 
better than others; and
•	 operational	disconnect	–	the	lack	
of communication between policy 
makers and implementers.
King and Crewe argue that steps can be 
taken to counteract these common errors, 
but also note that this will not occur 
without prior recognition of the danger. 
The same point could be made about 
the various cognitive biases described in 
the behavioural economics literature, to 
which policy advisers and policy decision-
makers can be just as prone as those 
whose behaviour government policy is 
seeking to influence. Tim Hughes wrote 
about this in a previous Policy Quarterly 
article, noting that: 
To the extent that advice is given 
or decisions are taken quickly, on 
partial information, on gut feel or 
the strength of the narrative case for 
change, they are likely to be subject 
to ... judgements that are known to 
be subject to many important biases. 
(Hughes, 2013, p.38) 
Some of the tools of policy or 
regulatory design, such as systematic 
impact analysis, consultation expecta-
tions, and other techniques for testing 
the robustness of regulatory proposals 
like regulatory pre-mortems (where you 
imagine a proposed regulation has failed 
and try to work out all the various ways 
that could have happened), are intended 
to help counter these risks. 
Even without policy-maker biases, 
however, the design of effective regulation 
is an inherently challenging task. The 
essence of regulation is an attempt to 
alter the behaviour of others to meet a 
specified objective (Black, 2002). Since 
different people, through inclination or 
circumstances, will respond in different 
ways, a regulatory regime needs to be 
designed to be able to deal with a range 
of behavioural responses. The choice of 
regulatory approach (e.g. prescriptive, 
process-based or results-based regulation) 
must also take careful account of the 
potential for innovation or continuous 
improvement, the likely capability 
and resourcing of the regulator, and 
also differences in our inherent ability 
to observe or measure the regulated 
behaviour and outcomes. 
To make matters even more difficult, 
regulation will frequently be applied 
within ‘complex adaptive systems’ 
(Dolphin and Nash, 2012; Eppel, 
Matheson	 and	Walton,	 2011).	 These	 are	
environments characterised by diverse, 
interdependent but self-organising 
actors, networks and institutions that 
continually influence, and in turn adapt 
to, each other’s behaviour and the broader 
environment. The system’s dynamics 
are typically non-linear and not geared 
toward equilibrium, making it inherently 
difficult or impossible to predict responses 
to and outcomes of regulatory policy 
change. Unanticipated and unintended 
consequences are therefore to be expected. 
In these circumstances, new regulation 
cannot be expected to be ‘right first 
time’, which means that many regulatory 
The essence of regulation is an attempt 
to alter the behaviour of others to meet a 
specified objective ...  unanticipated and 
unintended consequences are therefore to 
be expected
Why Departments Need to be Regulatory Stewards
Policy Quarterly – Volume 10, Issue 4 – November 2014 – Page 25
interventions are best treated as policy 
experiments. What this implies, as Peter 
Mumford	 has	 previously	 suggested,	 is	
that ‘If we do accept … the proposition 
that regulatory regimes are experiments, 
and novel regimes even more so, then 
constant monitoring and evaluation over 
time	are	critical’	(Mumford,	2011,	p.37).	
Mistakes in regulatory operations
Poor (or unlucky) policy design, however, 
is not the only cause of regulatory disasters. 
The evidence suggests that operational 
factors within the control of regulators are 
also important contributors. 
Learning from regulatory disasters 
was the theme of Julia Black’s Sir Frank 
Holmes	Memorial	Lecture	 in	Wellington	
in April 2014. She defined a regulatory 
disaster as one that results from ‘the 
unintended and unforeseen consequences 
of the design and/or operation of a 
regulatory system and its interaction with 
other systems’ (Black, 2014, p.4). From 
her analysis of the reports on several 
regulatory disasters, Black noted that: 
While the political and legal context 
has a role to play in shaping 
organisational processes, cultures 
and decision-making, a striking 
feature of all the regulatory disasters 
analysed here is the central role 
played by failures of governance and 
leadership within organisations, in 
both regulators and regulated firms. 
(ibid.,	p.6)	
Her analysis of the failings of these 
organisations led her to conclude that: 
•	 organisational	culture	matters;
•	 the	training,	skills	and	expertise	of	its	
personnel matters;
•	 organisational	failures	usually	come	
from the top; 
•	 organisations	often	take	the	path	of	
least resistance, and as a result can 
fail to manage risks strategically; and
•	 where	multiple	regulators	are	
involved, they consistently fail to 
coordinate among themselves in the 
operation of the regulatory system.
As part of its recent inquiry into 
regulatory institutions and practices, 
the Productivity Commission extended 
Black’s analysis to cover 18 reports 
of major disasters, seeking to test her 
hypothesis that regulatory failures were 
often a contributing cause, and to identify 
what aspects of regulation were implicated 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
2014, p.23). The commission found that 
a number of regulatory factors were 
frequently implicated, including:
•	 the	lack	of	clarity	of	the	regulator’s	
role;
•	 the	complexity	of	regulatory	regimes;
•	 weak	governance	and	management	of	
both regulator and regulated parties;
•	 weak	regulator	accountability,	
monitoring and oversight;
•	 the	capacity	and	resourcing	of	the	
regulator;
•	 failures	of	compliance	and	
enforcement;
•	 failure	to	understand	and	assess	risk;
•	 poor	engagement	and	
communication about regulatory 
requirements;
•	 the	culture	and	leadership	of	both	
regulators and regulated parties; and
•	 out-of-date	regulation	or	lack	of	
review of regulation.
While Black and the Productivity 
Commission sought to draw attention to 
the frequency with which some factors 
are linked to regulatory disasters, their 
findings also serve to highlight the wide 
range of factors that can contribute to 
those disasters. If there were just one or 
two specific factors strongly linked to 
almost all regulatory disasters, it would 
be relatively straightforward either to 
design a regime to significantly limit 
those particular risks, or to identify 
indicators to enable periodic monitoring 
of risk levels at modest cost. But with 
so many factors potentially in play, that 
significantly increases the difficulty of 
being able to design around, or spot the 
emergence of, possible future problems. 
Disasters are not the only form that 
regulatory failures can take
Major	 disasters	 are	 a	 particularly	 visible	
form of regulatory failure, due to the terrible 
harm they cause to those directly affected. 
The attention this also creates means that 
very significant amounts of ministerial and 
public servant time are then diverted to 
support urgent inquiries and reviews and 
to develop and implement an inevitable 
government response. But while the risk of 
regulatory overreaction is very real in these 
circumstances, there is at least a reasonable 
prospect that action will be taken that will 
improve the performance of the regulatory 
regime concerned. 
By contrast, regulatory failures due 
to the chronic underperformance of a 
regulatory regime are far less likely to 
attract policy-maker attention. In the 
absence of a systematic approach to regime 
monitoring and review, it is possible for 
unnecessary, ineffective and excessively 
costly regulation to persist for a very long 
time without any action being taken. 
Regulations of this nature have been called 
the ‘silent killers’, and should be considered 
a significant risk because the review of 
New Zealand’s regulatory regimes has 
been largely ‘built around “alarms going 
off” rather than “regular routine patrols”’ 
(Gill	and	Frankel,	2014,	p.60).
Managing regulation as an asset 
With so many different sources of 
potential regulatory failure, what should 
we be doing to ensure that New Zealand’s 
regulatory regimes function as assets 
rather than liabilities? 
regulatory failures due to the chronic 
underperformance of regulatory regimes 
... have been called the ‘silent killers’, 
and should be considered a significant 
risk ...
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Clearly it needs to start with good 
policy design, built around processes and 
tools that recognise and seek to counter 
the danger presented by common human 
decision-making errors and biases. While 
it is true that the practice rarely matches 
the rhetoric in any country, this is a 
key reason why governments in almost 
all OECD countries, and increasingly 
elsewhere, have introduced requirements 
for regulatory impact analysis and for 
consultation on regulatory proposals, in 
one form or another. Beyond these familiar 
requirements, the Treasury is considering 
whether there are simple ways to prompt 
policy advisers to, for instance, make 
appropriate allowance for unintended 
consequences and better identify the 
implementation challenges that need to 
inform the policy design stage.
But good policy design, even if that 
could be assured, is not enough to ensure 
that regulation continues to deliver a flow 
of future benefits. Even if a particular 
regulatory environment of interest is very 
stable, with limited technical innovation 
or change in the strategies of regulated 
parties over time, a ‘set and forget’ 
approach to regulation is still quite a 
risky one. We never have full knowledge 
of the existing regulatory situation, and 
cannot reasonably anticipate all potential 
consequences of a regulatory change or 
all future opportunities for improvement. 
Consequently, it does not make sense 
to rely solely on regulatory processes 
and tools that operate only during the 
policy and legislative design stage. Once a 
regulatory regime is operational, we should 
also monitor, evaluate and then, if feasible 
and appropriate, seek to fix, maintain and 
improve the regime over time.
This is, after all, what we do with our 
other important assets. George Tanner, 
the former chief parliamentary counsel 
and law commissioner, made just that 
point when he said, ‘we paint our houses 
and service our cars, but we don’t look 
after our laws in the same way’ (Gill, 2011, 
p.195). Organisations routinely employ a 
range of asset management techniques 
to help get the best performance out 
of their assets. So why has the state 
sector not systematically sought out and 
implemented the regulatory equivalents 
of those techniques in order to reduce 
the frequency and scale of regulatory 
failures, or maintain and improve the 
performance of regulation that can or 
does provide benefits in excess of costs?
Regulatory stewardship
If the answer to that question is that state 
agencies did not think that this was one 
of their core responsibilities, then recent 
developments within the New Zealand 
state services should be starting to change 
that point of view. One low-profile but 
important change made as part of the 
government’s Better Public Services 
initiative was to introduce the notion 
of ‘stewardship’ as a key responsibility 
of departmental chief executives. In 
particular, section 32 of the State Sector 
Act has been amended to provide that, 
among other things, the departmental 
chief executive is responsible for the 
stewardship of:
•	 the	department	itself,	including	
its medium- and long-term 
sustainability, organisational health, 
capability, and capacity to offer 
free and frank advice to successive 
governments; but also
•	 the	assets	and	liabilities	that	the	
department administers on behalf of 
the Crown; and
•	 the	legislation	administered	by	the	
department.
In support of this, the state services 
commissioner is also charged with 
‘promoting a culture of stewardship 
in the state services’. The Act defines 
stewardship as the ‘active planning and 
management of medium- and long-term 
interests, along with associated advice’. 
Much	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 this	 new	
stewardship responsibility to date has 
highlighted that it requires departments 
to adopt a longer-term perspective on 
Box 1: cabinet’s Initial Expectations for Regulatory stewardship (March 
2013)
Cabinet	 expects	 that	 departments,	 in	 exercising	 their	 stewardship	 role	 over	
government regulation, will:
•	 monitor,	and	thoroughly	assess	at	appropriate	intervals,	the	performance	
and condition of their regulatory regimes to ensure they are, and will 
remain, fit for purpose 
•	 be	able	to	clearly	articulate	what	those	regimes	are	trying	to	achieve,	
what types of costs and other impacts they may impose, and what 
factors pose the greatest risks to good regulatory performance 
•	 have	processes	to	use	this	information	to	identify	and	evaluate,	and	
where appropriate report or act on, problems, vulnerabilities and 
opportunities for improvement in the design and operation of those 
regimes 
•	 for	the	above	purposes,	maintain	an	up-to-date	database	of	the	
legislative instruments for which they have policy responsibility, with 
oversight roles clearly assigned within the department 
•	 not	propose	regulatory	change	without:	
– clearly identifying the policy or operational problem it needs to 
address, and undertaking impact analysis to provide assurance that 
the case for the proposed change is robust 
– careful implementation planning, including ensuring that 
implementation needs inform policy, and providing for appropriate 
review arrangements 
•	 maintain	a	transparent,	risk-based	compliance	and	enforcement	strategy,	
including providing accessible, timely information and support to help 
regulated entities understand and meet their regulatory requirements
•	 ensure	that	where	regulatory	functions	are	undertaken	outside	
departments, appropriate monitoring and accountability arrangements 
are maintained, which reflect the above expectations. 
Why Departments Need to be Regulatory Stewards
Policy Quarterly – Volume 10, Issue 4 – November 2014 – Page 27
their operations. At its core, however, 
being a steward simply means having 
a proactive duty of care for a resource 
that belongs to, or exists for the benefit 
of, others. The introduction of the 
stewardship responsibility sends a signal 
that departments can no longer just be 
passive, working only on those matters 
that their minister has deemed to be of 
interest or priority. They have a duty to 
systematically and proactively monitor, 
review and advise the minister on what 
can or should be done by the government 
to ensure New Zealanders obtain the best 
long-term benefit from the resources or 
assets for which they are steward. 
Concerning regulation more 
specifically, the key point to note is that 
a department’s statutory stewardship 
responsibility extends to the legislation 
administered by that department. To 
give departments a little more direction 
as	 to	 what	 this	 might	 mean,	 in	 March	
2013 Cabinet agreed to a set of ‘Initial 
Expectations for Regulatory Stewardship’ 
(see Box 1).
Naturally enough, these regulatory 
stewardship expectations promote the 
ongoing monitoring, evaluation and 
regulatory maintenance activities that I 
have suggested are essential if we wish 
to reduce the scope for and size of 
future regulatory failures, whether in 
the form of disasters or of the chronic 
underperformance of a regulatory regime. 
The prominence given to regulatory 
regimes in the expectations seeks to shift 
attention from a narrow focus on the 
‘flow’ of proposed regulatory changes 
to a broader focus on the performance 
and condition of the underlying ‘stock’ 
of regulation. Lifting the attention 
level to regimes is also intended to help 
departments focus on the ultimate policy 
outcomes sought by the government, 
and encourage them to bring a systems 
perspective to their monitoring and 
analysis (i.e. looking at how related 
instruments and their associated 
institutional actors interact in pursuit of 
those key outcomes), which a focus on 
individual acts or regulations would be 
less likely to do.
The expectations for regulatory 
stewardship, therefore, seek to encourage 
better management of New Zealand’s 
important regulatory assets. Indeed, 
the initial set of expectations agreed by 
ministers can be viewed as introducing 
some very basic asset management 
concepts to the regulatory environment. 
There is a long way to go, however, 
before we will be able to say that the 
techniques we have for managing New 
Zealand’s regulatory arrangements are 
as good as those currently applied to the 
management of other assets important to 
New Zealanders. That is why these were 
deliberately described as a set of initial 
expectations. It is hoped that they will be 
further developed and refined as we all 
learn more about the range of practices 
that different departments introduce 
and find helpful in discharging their 
regulatory stewardship responsibilities. 
They may even need to be tailored for 
different agency roles, since the current 
expectations were developed primarily 
for departments with regulatory policy 
responsibilities, rather than agencies that 
primarily exercise regulatory powers. The 
development of regulatory stewardship 
practice, just as with some regulatory 
policy interventions, is a bit of an 
experiment, and so ongoing monitoring, 
evaluation and adjustment is likely to be 
required. 
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